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A computer war game is developed to measure the effect of false
contacts on the probability of detecting a submarine. The variables
are the probability of correctly classifying a non-submarine contact,
the probability of correctly classifying a submarine contact, and the
false contact density. A scenario is developed to focus on the false
contact problem while holding other ASW variables constant. It is
concluded from the output of the game that the effect of false contacts
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Considerable study effort has been expended on the problem of
determining the probability of detecting a submarine in various Anti-
submarine Warfare (ASW) environments and tactical situations. In the
phase of search and detection, classification of sonar contacts has been
recognized as a serious complication. This complication develops
because there are many substances in the sea that reflect a sonar
signal in much the same way as a submarine. Thus, a sonar contact
that is in fact a submarine may be classified as non-submarine while
a non-submarine or false contact may be classified as a submarine.
In the first case the searching units continue looking for a submarine
that has already been found while in the latter case the time available
for the search is expended prosecuting a false contact.
Much has been done to improve the classification capability of
ASW forces but the problem continues to be a serious one. In many
ASW studies however, classification of sonar contacts is not considered.
In Danskin's study [1] non-submarine contacts are not introduced into
the problem and consequently it is neither necessary to revisit an area
once it has been searched nor is time wasted prosecuting false contacts.
Hammon [2] takes a typical war-gaming approach to the problem by
assuming that for each helicopter a false contact is generated on any
dip with a specified probability, and if a false contact is developed it
is prosecuted by that one helicopter for a random period of time before
it is correctly classified. It is implicitly assumed that this in no way
influences the search for the submarine by the other helicopters.
The conclusions of both studies are valid if there exists a suitable
degradation factor in the probability of detection that accounts for the
effect of false contacts on the operational relationship among searching
units. Unfortunately, the probabilities of correct classification are
neither known with any degree of certainty nor are they static. In the
Major Fleet Escort Study [3] it was assumed that a learning curve
existed and that the probability of making an attack on a false contact,
as a consequence of an incorrect classification, was a decreasing
function of time
.
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the effect of false
contacts on the probability of detecting a submarine in order to develop
the relationship between the interactions among units and the probabil-
ities of correctly classifying sonar contacts. This thesis will develop
probability of detection curves as a function of the probabilities of
correct classification for all values between zero and one.
II. SCENARIO AND ASSUMPTIONS
In order to isolate the effect of false contacts a scenario was
developed which held constant everything except those variables which
bear on the classification problem. Although this creates a rather
fictitious state of nature it does focus on the problem in its simpliest
form much the same as a partial derivative represents the rate of change
of a complicated function with respect to only one variable.
The scenario is initiated by a submarine being detected by an
outside agent. Neither the type of initial detection nor the length of
time that the submarine is tracked is important. The only assumption
necessary is that the contacting agent is certain that the contact is a
submarine and can determine the position of the contact accurately.
The contacting agent calls for helicopter assistance and then loses
contact establishing the location of the last known position of the
submarine (DATUM). The submarine assumes helicopters have been
called in; dives to its best depth to avoid helicopter sonar detection,
and proceeds to clear DATUM at a constant, randomly selected, speed
less than or equal to its maximum speed available. The helicopters
arrive at DATUM at some time late and commence the search. They have
a specified time on station available for the search and if the submarine
is not found by that time the search is discontinued. It is assumed that
the helicopters know the maximum speed available to the submarine,
but they cannot deduce either speed or course intelligence from the
tactical situation. They therefore commence a random dip search within
the submarine's farthest-on circle allowing only a specified fraction of
their detection range capability to overlap with any other unit's search
area or the farthest-on circle. For its part the submarine can gain no
intelligence from the active sonar transmissions of the helicopters and
thus elects to take no evasive action. It is also assumed that the
original contacting agent offers no further assistance to the helicopters.
The helicopters have a "cookie cutter sonar" which always detects
a contact that is within range and never detects a contact that is not
within range. When a helicopter detects a contact the classification
process begins .
It is assumed that during the classification process there exists
a constant probability that a valid contact will be correctly classified.
There also exists a probability of correctly classifying a non-submarine
contact however, in this case, it is assumed that the decision process
in classifying a contact is influenced by previous classifications of the
same contact. Thus it is assumed that a contact that has already been
incorrectly classified is more likely to be incorrectly classified again
than is a contact that is being classified for the first time. Alternatively
the probability of generating a false contact prosecution is less than the
probability of incorrectly classifying a contact given that it has already
been incorrectly classified.
If the submarine is detected and correctly classified the search is
successful. If the submarine is incorrectly classified the helicopter
will continue searching for other contacts. If no others are found and if
the helicopter has not reached the end of its dip cycle then the submarine
contact will be re-evaluated.
If a false contact is detected and correctly classified it is marked,
so that no other unit will subsequently consider it, and the search is
continued for the submarine. If the false contact is incorrectly
classified the helicopter goes into the track mode and immediately re-
evaluates the contact. The effect of two successive classification
opportunities is to raise the probability of correctly classifying the
initial contact in line with the previous discussion. If the contact is
again incorrectly classified then a false contact prosecution is generated.
If the number of helicopters prosecuting a false contact is less
than a specified number and if another helicopter is available then it
is called in to assist. When it arrives all units on the scene re-evaluate
the contact. If the joint classification is correct the contact is scrubbed
and all units return to the submarine search. Otherwise, all units
continue to track the contact. Helicopters never lose contact on the
false contact. This process is repeated incrementing the number of
helicopters on the scene until either the contact is correctly classified
or time on station is exceeded. The overall probability of detection is
then computed as the number of times the search is successful divided
by the number of times the scenario is run.
III. DESCRIPTION OF THE MODEL
A Monte Carlo event store computer war game, named "Helicopter
DATUM Search" (HSDS) , was developed to implement the scenario and
assumptions. The principals of the game are the helicopters, submarine,
and the false contacts. The helicopters have attributes of location and
status while the submarine and and false contacts have attributes of
location, velocity and status. HSDS can handle variations in tactics
of either the submarine or helicopters. Up to 6 helicopters and up to
1000 false contacts can be introduced with any combination of time
late, time on station, and probabilities of correct classification. This
provides the capability within HSDS of varying the density of false
contacts and the size of the initial area that the submarine can be in
when the helicopters first arrive at DATUM.
The logic of the game is written in FORTRAN IV for the IBM 3 60
computer and several support routines are written in OS/3 60 Assembler
Language. The entire game is modularized with each function programmed
as a separate subroutine to permit ease in modification for future study.
The entire program requires less than 100K bytes of core storage and one
run of 1000 replications with 4 helicopters and 2 50 false contacts requires
slightly less than 5 minutes computing time.
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A. EXECUTIVE ROUTINE
This section contains a description of the executive routine, or
MAIN program, followed by the subroutines that support the MAIN program
These routines are written in FORTRAN IV and listed in Appendices B and
D. A diagram of the flow between the MAIN program and the Events is
contained in Figure 1
.
The MAIN program first reads the input data. The salient parts
of the input data are then printed and the run and first game are
initialized. The helicopters start at DATUM. The submarine's speed is
determined by a random number multiplied by the submarine's maximum
speed. False contacts are distributed uniformly within an area bounded
by the submarine's farthest-on circle at the end of time on station. A
control loop is then entered taking the top event off the calendar and
checking to see if time on station has been exceeded. If so, a branch
is made to Subroutine OVER. Otherwise, the appropriate routine is
called and upon normal return from that routine the program loops back
to get another event from the calendar. Upon normal return from sub-
routine OVER the program loops back to initialize the next game. If
this was the last replication of the run the results of the current run
are printed and the MAIN program loops back to read another input card
for the next run. If all cards have been read, and thus all runs are
complete, the program terminates. K
Subroutine OVER computes statistics for each game. The total

































end of the first group of replications the random number generator is reset
and the sign of the argument for the random number generator is changed.
This causes the next stream of random numbers to be the compliment of
the previous stream. The resulting statistics are assumed to have the
Antithetic properties discussed in Hillier and Lieberman [4] . This is a
technique which uses negative correlation between groups to produce a
negative covariance thereby reducing the variance of the average of the
groups. A special return to the MAIN program is made if the last
replication of all groups has been played to indicate the end of the run.
Subroutine SETUP computes the time interval for each branch to
the SEE event and schedules the SEE event on the calendar.
B. EVENTS
This section contains a description of the event routines followed
by the subroutines that support the event routines. Each of these
routines are written in FORTRAN IV and listed in Appendices B and D.
Event BRKDIP calculates the next dip position of a specified
helicopter by using two random numbers to compute the X and Y coordinates
of the new DIP station. If this position is within the farthest-on circle
of the submarine and does not overlap another helicopter's search area
by more than the specified amount, then a DIP event is scheduled for
that position after calculating the time to station. Helicopters transit
between DIP stations at 90 knots and require 3 minutes for lowering
and raising the sonar dome. If either of the above tests fail a new
position is calculated. Note that an infinite loop can be generated here
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if the sum of the helicopter's search areas is greater than the area
within the submarine's farthest-on circle.
Event DIP handles the helicopter in the search phase. It first
schedules a BRKDIP event and then branches to subroutine DET for
detections. A normal return to the MAIN program is made if there were
no detections. If a detection was made a branch is made to subroutine
CLASS to determine the classification. If the submarine was the contact
detected and it is correctly classified a special return is made to the
MAIN program to indicate the search has been completed successfully.
If the submarine was incorrectly classified a RELOOK event is scheduled.
RELOOK is an entry point in the DIP routine just before the call to sub-
routine CLASS. If a non-submarine contact was detected and correctly
classified the non-submarine's status is changed to inactive and a
branch is made to subroutine DET to determine if any more detections
are possible on this dip. If a non-submarine was detected and incorrectly
classified a TRACK event is scheduled for the current game time.
Subroutine CLASS determines the classification of a contact,
submarine or non-submarine, by comparing the input probability of
correct classification with a random number.
Subroutine DET computes the index of the first contact that is
within sonar range of the specified helicopter. Only active contacts
are considered for detection. This routine gives a slight advantage to
the helicopters since the submarine is always the first contact considered.
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Subroutine UPDATE computes the position of all active contacts
for the present game time.
Event SEE prints the position and status of all helicopters and
contacts at the present game time.
Event TRACK handles the prosecution of false contacts. A branch
is made to subroutine JOINT to determine the current classification.
If this classification is correct, a branch is made to subroutine RESUME
to discontinue prosecution of the contact. If the current classification
is incorrect another TRACK event is scheduled and the number of
helicopters on the scene is determined. If the number on the scene is
less than the maximum number allowed and if there is another helicopter
enroute to a new DIP station or in a DIP but not prosecuting a contact,
that helicopter is sent to the scene. The position of all helicopters on
the scene is then updated to the false contact's present position.
Subroutine JOINT determines the composite classification of the
contact by all of the units on the scene prosecuting the false contact.
The criterion for the classification is an average value computed as
follows:
NOS(K)
SUM = l/NOS(K) X -~" X(j)
f=l
where X(j) = 1 for RN(TX) < PCNS
X(j) = for RN(TX)> PCNS
NOS(K) = number of helicopters prosecuting contact K
PCNS = probability of correctly classifying a false contact
RN(IX) = random number from stream IX
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The classification is correct if SUM is greater than PCNS and incorrect
otherwise.
Subroutine RESUME calls BRKDIP for each helicopter that has been
prosecuting a false contact and then sets the inactive code for that
contact.
C. SUPPORT ROUTINES
The following routines, written in OS/3 60 Assembler Language,
are general to any simulation and are not included in Appendices B and D.
RN is an additive random number generator which can produce a
minimum of 16 unigue random number streams. If the argument to the
function is zero the generator is initialized and no number is returned.
A positive argument produces a random number from the specified stream
of numbers while a negative argument produces the compliment random
number from the same stream. Two generators are used in HSDS; one
for movement and position variables
,
and the other to determine
classifications .
Subroutines INT, TNE, SNE , and REMOVE comprise the event
calendar package. INT initializes the calendar and must be called
before the calendar is used. TNE takes the top event off the calendar.
SNE stores an event on the calendar in its proper time seguence.
REMOVE nullifies all events on the calendar which have a specified
value for a specified attribute. In HSDS events are removed from the
calendar as they are invalidated rather than checking each event as it
is returned by TNE.
16
Subroutine CALFUL, called when an error condition develops,
terminates the program and produces a core dump.
Subroutine MOMENT calculates the mean and standard deviation
of an input group of data.
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IV. VALIDATION AND ANALYSIS
The first objective of this thesis was to measure the effect of the
probability of correctly classifying a non-submarine on the overall
probability of detection. Within the general scenario of Chapter II, a
set of conditions, designed the base conditions, was chosen as follows:
Number of helicopters 4
Time late to DATUM 15 min.
Time on station 60 min.
Expected sonar range 3 000 yards
Maximum submarine speed 2 kts
.
Number of false contacts 250
Probability of correctly classifying a submarine contact 0.8
This corresponds to a false contact density of . 1 contacts per square
mile; a probability of detecting a false contact of . 7 for any helicopter
on any dip, and a probability of detecting the submarine on the first dip
after reaching DATUM of 0.053 for any helicopter. This last probability
is computed using time late plus the expected value of 4 . 5 minutes for
the time from DATUM until the helicopter is in the first dip and searching
for the submarine to determine the submarine's farthest-on circle. The
probability of detection is then the area of the helicopter's sonar search
divided by the area within the submarine's farthest-on circle. These
conditions were chosen because other studies have considered the same
or similar conditions.
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A. RESULTS AND VALIDATION
Before a production run was made for each parameter, a pilot study
was conducted to determine the number of runs that would produce
statistics with an acceptable variance in the minimum amount of computing
time. The number of runs described in the following sections are a result
of such a pilot study.
The probability of correctly classifying a non-submarine contact
(PCNS) was incremented from 1.0 to 0.0 and at each point 2 000 repli-
cations of the game were run and the probability of detection calculated.
The manner in which helicopters interacted was considered to be the
maximum number of helicopters that would prosecute a contact (MAXNOS) .
As a result of these runs the probability of detection as a function of
PCNS and MAXNOS is tabulated in Table 1. Additionally since a false
contact must be incorrectly classified twice in succession to generate
a false contact prosecution, PNFC is defined as the probability of NOT
generating a false contact prosecution. PNFC is computed as:

































The Probability of Detection
TABLE I
For each value of the maximum number of helicopters that will prosecute
a submarine, the probability of detection is well approximated by a
linear function in PNFC . A representative linear fit of the data is
plotted in Figure 2. The linearity assumption between the probability
of detection and PNFC appears reasonable since, with independent
random dipping, the probability of detection should be degraded only by
time lost in prosecuting false contacts. This is in contrast with a search
plan where helicopters work together and the effectiveness of the search
plan is dependent on the completion of a particular pattern. The probability
of detection when PCNS is 1.0 is also reasonable. In LCDR Buck's
study [5], which does not consider false contacts, the probability of
detection for two helicopters against a closing submarine under the same















PROBABILITY OF DETECTION (Pd)
vs
PROBABILITY OF NOT GENERATING




four helicopters searching for a submarine that can depart DATUM in
any direction and the probabilities of detection are in close agreement.
B . ANALYSIS
The results of Table I demonstrate how the effect of false contacts
varies with the extent of helicopter interaction. Figure 3 is a plot of
the least square fit of the data taken of the probability of detection as
a function of PNFC for the maximum number of helicopters that will
prosecute a contact (MAXNOS) . The gap at PNFC equals 1 . is the
result of the least square approximation.
Because of the simplicity of the scenario and tactics, it is possible
to compute the probability of detection for all of the helicopters on the
first dip analytically. Consider PNFC equal zero so that any helicopter
detecting a false contact is lost to the search for the remaining time
left on station. For MAXNOS of 1 the probability of detection for all of
the helicopters on the first dip is equal to the sum of the probabilities
that each helicopter detects the submarine on its first dip multiplied
by the probability that the submarine is correctly classified. This is
so since the actions of each helicopter are independent. If a false
contact is detected and hence incorrectly classified by a helicopter,
it is prosecuted by that one helicopter while the other helicopters
continue the search unaffected. For the base conditions the overall
probability of detection is approximately
















PROBABILITY OF DETECTION (Pd)
vs
PROBABILITY OF NOT GENERATING
A FALSE CONTACT (PNFC)
FIGURE 3
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When MAXNOS is greater than 1 the actions of each helicopter
are no longer independent. The first helicopter to dip detects the
submarine with probability 0.053 and detects a false contact and in-
correctly classifies it as submarine with probability 0.7. If the first
helicopter detects and incorrectly classifies a false contact the next
helicopter comes to the first helicopter's assistance rather than con-
tinuing to its first dip station and thus never gets into the search for
the submarine. The actions of each helicopter in turn depend on what
has occurred to the previous helicopters. The overall probability of
detecting the submarine for all of the helicopters is then the uncon-
ditioned probability of the sum of each conditional probability which is
calculated below. In these calculations it is assumed that on the first
dip the time required for a joint classification exceeds the time to
station for subsequent helicopters and therefore no more than one
helicopter can come to the assistance of another helicopter.
Let:
A = The event the submarine is correctly classified
given that the submarine is detected
B/j = The event the submarine is detected by helicopter
j given that helicopter j is not diverted
C/l = The event that helicopter 1 is not diverted which
always happens
C/2 = The event that helicopter 2 is not diverted which
happens only if helicopter 1 does not detect and




The event that helicopter 3 is not diverted which happens
only if:
1) helicopter 1 detects and incorrectly classifies a
false contact thus diverting helicopter 2, or
2) neither helicopters 1 nor 2 detect a false contact
The event helicopter 4 is not diverted which happens
only if:
1) helicopter 1 detects and incorrectly classifies a
false contact diverting helicopter 2 and helicopter
3 does not detect a false contact, or
2) helicopter 1 does not detect a false contact and
helicopter 2 does detect and incorrectly classifies
a false contact diverting helicopter 3, or










Probability of detection multiplied by
the probability the submarine is not






0.7 x 0.3 + 0.3x0.7 + 0.3'
And:
The overall probability of detection is:
4
2 P(A) x P(B/j) x P(C/j)
j=l
= 0.101
This is in comparison with the 0.17 probability of detection when there
is no interaction between helicopters.
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When PNFC is greater than zero the analysis is the same except
that the conditional probabilities are further conditioned on the generation
of a false contact prosecution given that a false contact has been detected
by a previous helicopter. The difference in the probability of detection
between MAXNOS of 1 and values greater than 1 approaches zero as PNFC
approaches one.
The total probability of detection is of course greater than the
probability of detection on the first dip but an analytic computation for
subseguent dips becomes guite involved since the single dip probability
of detection decreases as the sguare of the submarine's maximum speed.
What the analytic computation for the first dip shows is that the dis-
proportionate degradiations in the probability of detection for MAXNOS
of 1 , 2, and 4 is neither an accident nor a mistake. Thus even when
the probability of detection is a simple linear function of the probability
of prosecuting a false contact for any individual unit, the probability
of detection for the group varies in a much more complicated manner.
C. EFFECT OF OTHER VARIABLES
Since the probability of detection is conditioned on the probability
of correctly classifying a submarine contact (PCS) and the probability
of detecting a false contact, or false contact density, it is necessary
to determine how the probability of detection varies as a function of
PCS and the false contact density. Although an argument can be made
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independent and can be treated separately. No assumption is made that
either PCNS and PCS or PCNS and the false contact density are independen
PCNS was fixed at 0.4 and the probability of correctly classifying
a submarine was incremented from 1.0 to 0.0 with 1000 replications
made at each data point. The results are well approximated by a fourth
degree least sguare polynomial as plotted in Figure 4. The significance
of this curve is both in its effect on the conditional probability of
detection as previously discussed and on the design trade-offs in
hardware. In many cases an increase in the range of a detector, and
thus an increase in the conditional probability of detection of the sub-
marine, is accompanied by a degradation in the classification clues.
Such is the case when going to lower frequency sonars. Under
conditions where the probability of correct classification is high, say
greater than 0.6, a greater degradiation can be accepted in classification
clues, or classification capability, than when the probability of correct
classification is low, say less than 0.4. This is because the slope of
the probability of detection curve is decreasing with increasing probability
of correct classification.
Figure 5 is a plot of the least square linear fit of the probability
of detection as the false contact density was incremented from
. to
0.2 false contacts per square mile. PCNS and PCS were set at 0.4 and
0.8 respectively and the maximum number of helicopters to prosecute
a false contact was set at 4. Each data point is the result of 1000
replications of the game. Least square polynomials of higher degree
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The analysis of Chapter IV indicates that the effect of false contacts
is not obvious even under the simpliest of conditions. It is not un-
reasonable to assume that as the tactics become more involved the effect
of false contacts becomes more deeply embedded in the interrelationships
between units. This is particularly true when different types of units
with different sensors and classification capabilities operate together.
The analytic formulation of such a problem is formidable is not impossible.
However, if the interrelationships can be well defined such a problem
can be formulated as a game.
It is important to recognize that false contacts can play as large
a part in the probability of detection of a submarine as any other
parameter. It is therefore recommended that classification and the
effect of false contacts be considered in future ASW studies. This could
be accomplished by running a pilot study of the tactics under consideration
in a simulation, such as the game in this thesis, in order to develop the
appropriate degradation curves for those tactics and forces. It is further
recommended that future ASW war games consider the interrelationships
between units when developing the logic for false contact prosecutions.
This is of particular importance where the game will be used to help in
the evaluation of new eguipments where trade-offs have been made in
the classification capability.
30
There are several areas within this thesis which could be fruitful
topics for further study. Current helicopter search plans could be
implemented, by changing the BRKDIP routine, in order to study their
sensitivity to classification errors. Subroutine JOINT could be modified
to provide for the inclusion of different types of sensors to aid in the
classification process when more than one unit is on the scene. Finally,






The following is a list of input variables in the order that they are
read into the program:
IN Input data set number
OUT Output data set number
IRUN Number of this run
NGRPS Number of groups for each run
NREPS Number of replications for each group
LX Argument for the random number generator
NN Number of intervals in the first game that the
positions of all units will be printed
NHS Number of helicopters
TL Time late
DELT Duration of each dip
TOS Time on station
RS Maximum sonar range
OVRLAP Amount of overlap permitted between two HS sonar
search areas
NUM Number of false contacts (The program increments
this number by 1 to include the SS in all calculations)
VMAX Maximum speed of the SS
PCS Probability of correctly classifying a submarine
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PCNS Probability of correctly classifying a non-submarine
MAXNOS Maximum number of HS that will prosecute a false
contact
B. INTERNAL VARIABLES
The following is a list of variables internal to the program as they
appear in common:
XS(J) X position of contact J
YS(J) Y position of contact J
VXS(J) X velocity component of contact J
VYS(J) Y velocity component of contact J
ISTAT(J) Status of contact J
=> Active, 1 => Inactive
TS(J) Time contact J was last updated
NOS(J) Number of HS prosecuting contact J
MAX Minimum of (NHS, MAXNOS)
XH(J) X position of helicopter J
YH(J) Y position of helicopter J
ICODE(J) Status of helicopter J
-1 => Airborne enroute to next dip
=> In dip searching
N > = N prosecuting contact N
TP Current game time
IDUM Dummy variable for arguments to SNE
NS Number of times the submarine was detected
in this group
TAVG(N) Time to detection for detection N
NGAME Counter for the number of games played
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C. OUTPUT VARIABLES
The following is a list of variables output by the program in the
order that they are printed:
XBAR Average probability of detection
SD Standard deviation of the probability of detection
AVG(J) Probability of detection for group J
TBAR Average time to detection given that a detection
was made
TSD Standard deviation for time to detection




The following is a list of symbols and their meanings used in the
flow charts of HSDS.





Set of calculations expanded
on a following flow chart
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CARD VARIABLE CARD FORMAT
NO. NAME COLUMN
RANGE UNITS
4 NUM 1-10 110 0<NUM1999
4 VMAX 1-20 F
4 PCS 21-30 F 0.0£PCS<1.0
4 PCNS 31-40 F 0.0^PCNS<1.0
4 MAXNOS 41-45 15 MAXNOS >0
knots
NOTE: F denotes a real variable requiring 10 card columns and a
decimal point.
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CCNMCN /SS/ XS(IOOO) ,YS(1000).VXS( 1000) ,V^
MSTAT( 1000 ),TS( 100 0) ,VMAX,NJS( 1 COO ) , NUM , M
CCPMCN /HS/ XH(6) ,YH(fc)
,
ICGDEI6) , RS , CELT , NHS » TL , TOS




NCiTBARf TSCfNGAVE,NREPS,NGRPStICUT,CVKLAP t XBAR,SD
REAC INPUT CATA
PEADK,199) IN, ICUT
REA0(IN t 10C) IRLN,NGRPS»NREPS,IX ,NN
READ (IN i 101 )NHS,TLf DELT i TOSt KSi CVRLAP
RS=FS/2000.0
7CC READ(IN,lC2,6NO = 90C)NUV f \/VAX,PCS,PCNS,MAXNCS
^Ax = ^'I^o(MAXNus,NHS )
fePITE INPUT PARAMETERS FUR THIS RUN
UF ITE( IUUT ,200) IRUN
IFLN=IPUN+1
PPS=PS*20CC.C
kPITE( ICUT , 201 )NREPS f IXtNHSt TLt TCSf RRS
WFITE(ICUT,202)VMAX,NUM,PCS,PCNS,MAX




















CC 3C2 1=1 ,NHS
CALL BRKDIPt I)
302 CCNTINUE
SFT SS CCUPSE SPEEC 6 STATUS
VXS( 1)=PN1 <IX)*VMAX
VYS( 1) = 0.0














XS( I ) = »M( IX )*2.0*R-R
VS( I )=kN 1 < I X ) *2.0*R-P
VXS( I ) = 0.0
V Y S (I) = 3 .
NCS( I )=C
ISTATI! )=0
t s c i ) =n
CONTINUE
T /IK t NEXT tVUNT ANT CHECK TI^E
CALL TNF(TTp,ISL» f ILNIT,IVAL» 6 C -' CW )
IF (TTP-TP) 70 1,702,702
C /> L L C A L F U L ( 1 5 )
TF=TTP
IF (TP+TL-7QS) 402,mC2,403
CC TL PPCPLR EVENT KCUTINE, EXECUTE EVENT











.CC TC (601,602, 6 3,604,6 5,606,60 7,608 ) , I SUE
CALL bRKTIPl IUNIT)
CCTO 401
CALL DIP( IUNIT, 6403
)
CCTO 40 1
CALL CET( IUNIT , IVAL )
GCTC 401
CALL TwAC* ( IVAL )
GLTC 401






THIS CAVE IS CCNPLtTE
C£LL CVER( 6404 )
KGAKE = NGAI*E + 1
GCTC 5>00
T) I S RUN I S COMPLETE




WRITE* IC.UT,203 ) XriAR,SL
WFITEl ICLT ,204) ( AVC( I ) , I =1 ,NGRPS)


































































, 3F10.0, I 5)
1H1 ,2CX,30HHS DATUM SEARCH *** RUN NUMBER,
-GP THIS RUN,20X t 2AHTHE INPUT PARAMETERS
(XM
8
NLMBEK SECUENCe'lS . I 2 ,//10X, 9HTHERE ARC


















ATICN DF,F6.1»8H N I NUTE S , / /10X
,
AiMGE =,F8.2, 6H YARDS,/)
MAXIMUM SUBMARINE SPEED lSfF5.lt
HERF ARE ,I3,15H FALSE CONTACTS,//
ITY GF CORRECTLY CLASSIFING A ,
T IS,F5.2,//10X,16HTHE FRCBAEILITY
SSIFING ^ NON-SUBMARINE CONTACT IS,
T,I2,27H HELICOPTERS WILL PROSECUTE
SULTS OF THIS RUN,//10X,
CF DETECTIUN W AS , F 9. 5 , / / 10X
,
D DEVIATION OF, (=8. 5/)
PROBABILITIES BY GROUP WERE,F8.5,
AVERAGE TIME TO DETECTION r>AS,F10.5
TANCARD DEVIATION OF , F 1 C. 5 , // 1 OX
,
E SIZE OF ,14)
SLBPCUTINE BRKDIP(N)
CCfMCN /SS/ XS(IOOO) ,YS(1000 ),VXS( 1000) ,VYS( 1000),
*ISTAT( 1C00) ,TS( 1000) . VMAX,NQSUOOO) ,NUM,MAX
CCMMCN /HS/ XH(6) ,YF(6)
,
ICODE ( 6 ) , R S , DEL T , NHS , TL , TO
S




CANCEL ALL FUTURE EVFNTS AND SET AIRBORNE COCE
CALL PEMCVF(2,N)
ICCDF (N)=-l
CCNPLTE ANC TEST NEXT HIP STATICN
R = VNAX*TP/6-0.0
5CC X=PN1( IX)*2.0*R-R
Y = RN1( IX)*2.0*R-R
IF MX*-X +Y*Y)-(R-RS)**2) 400,400,500
400 CC 3C0 1 = 1, NHS
P1=(X-XH(N) 1**2+ (Y-YH(N) 1**2
IF (SCPT(Pl) - CVRLAP*RS) 500,500,300
300 CONTINUE
CCMPUTE TINE TC STATICN & STORE DIP EVENT









CCNVCN /SS/ XS ( 1000), YS( 1000), VXS( 1000) ,VYS( 1C0C) ,
*I STAT( 1000 ) , TS( 100C) , V N A X , NO S ( 1 COO ) ,NU M ,VAX
CLNNCN /HS/ XH( 6 ) , Yh( 6) , ICOOEf 6 ) ,PS,DELT,NHS ,TL,TCS
CCNMCN /UT lL/TPt IX,PCS,PCNS, I DU f , MS , A VG ( 2 ) , TAVG( 1000)
,
*NCfTHAK,TSDtNGAVEtNRFPS,NGRPS t ICUT,CVRLAH,XH^P.,SC
J IS THE SL3SCRIPT CE TEE CONTACT
K IS THE CLASSIFICATION CODE
IE (J-l) <<C2,4CC,4C2
IF (RN2UX )-PCS) 5CC, 500,401
4C I K = 2
GCTO 500
<*Q2 K = 2
IE IRN2( IX I-OCNS) 5 CO, 500, 40
4








COMMON /HS/ XH(f.) ,YH(6> , ICOOc(t)) ,RS,DELT,NHS,TL ,TGS
CCNMON /UT IL/TP, !X,PCS,PCNS, IDUN,NS,AVG(?) ,TAVG( 1000) ,
* NC , T H A R , T S C , NG A (* t , N P E P S , NG R P S , I C UT , C V R L A P , X 3 AR , S D
CALL UPDATE
SET K = THE SUBSCRIPT CF THE
RANGE UP = IF NO CONTACT IS
Cf 2C0 1=1 ,NUM















40 1 ,401 ,300
)-YS< I ) »**2
SLERCUTINE CIP(N,»)
CCNVCN /SS/ XS( 1000 ),YS( 1000) ,VXS( 1000) ,VYS( 1C00) ,
*ISTAT( 1000 ) ,TS( 1000) , WAX ,NOS ( 1 000 ) ,NUM,MAX
COMMON /HS/ XH( t) ,YH( 6) ,ICC0E(6) , R S , 0£ L T , NH S , T L , TGSCC^CN /LTIL/TP,IX,PCS,PCNS, I 0\)P , NS , AVG ( 2 )
,
TAVG( 1000)

























THE SS HAS BEEN DETECTED £ CORRECTLY CLASSIFIED
ISTATI 1)=1
RETURN 1
THE FALSE CCNTACT HAS BEEN CORRECTLY CLASSIFIED.
CFLETE IT L CHECK FCR MORE CONTACTS
ISTATIK ) = 1
GLTO 500
TFF SS HAS 6EEN INCORRECTLY CLASSIFIED.




THE FALSE CCNTACT HAS BEEN INCORRECTLY CLASSIFIED
SCHEDULE A TRACK EVENT FOR THE CURRENT GAME TIME
NCS(K)=1
ICCDE(N)=K
CALL REMOVE! 2, N)
CALL SNE(TF,4, ICUM.K, &999 )
4C2 RETUFN






DC 300 1=1 .M





IF THE AVERAGE IS GREATER THAN THE INPUT


















IF THIS WAS THfc LAST REPLIC^TICN COMPUTE
THE AVEKACE NUMBER CF DETECTIONS £ SESET
THE CCUNTFPS & RANFCV NUMBER GENERATORS
IF (NGAKE/NREPS*NRfcPS-NGAMFi ) 50C,4C?,bOC
INP=NGAMF/N <FPS






IF THIS ^AS THF LAST GAVE COMPUTE
STATISTICS r. SIGNAL OUTPUT
(NGANE-N^FPS^NGRPS) 500,40 3 ,403



















CCMMCN /SS/ XS(IOOO) ,YS( 1000 ) ,VXSUCOO) ,VYS< 1CC0) ,M STAT< 1000 ) ,TS( 1000) , VM AX , NUS ( 1 000 ) , NUM. MAX
CI.MMON /MS/ XH( c)
,
YF( 6) , I C COE ( 6 ) , R S , DEL T , Nh 5 , T L , TCS
CCNMCN /UT IL/TP, IX,RCS, PONS, IOUM,NS, AVG< ? ) t TAVG( 1000) ,
*NC f THAP , TSL , \GA*F , M< E f1 S , NGH P i , I CUT, CVRLAP ,XBAK,SP
ANC CANCEL
CONTACT
SET NUMBER CN TFE SCFNE TO
Af v STORED EVENTS FCR THIS
NCS(K)=0
CALL RPMLVFt 3,K)
CC 300 1 = 1, NHS
CALL bPKDIP FOR ALL UMTS GN THE SCENE
IE ( 1CUCL( 1 )-K ) 300,^01, 300
4C1 CALL BKKTI P( I
)
3CC CCM1NUF
F r LFTE THE FALSE CONTACT
ISTATU ) = 1
RETURN
SLERCUTINE SEE
CCMMGN /SS/ XS< 1000) ,YS( 1000) ,VXS( 1000) ,VYS( 1CC0)
,
*I STAT( 1000 ) ,TS( 100C) , V M AX , NHS ( 1 000 ) ,NUM,MAX
61 f ICC0E(6) v KSfOELTfNHSiTLf TCS
S, PCNS, IDUP,NS, AVG(2 ) ,TAVG( 1C0 0) ,
!VRLAP,xaAR,SD
CCPfC.N /HS/ XH( 6) , YH(
CCMMCN /UT IL/TP, IX, PC
*N(,TFAR,TSC,NGAME,NREPS,NGRPS,ICUT,
kR I TF ( IOUT,200 ) TR
PRINT EACH HS PLSITICN & kANGE TO THF SS
59
R=SQRTHXH< I >-XS(lH**2-MYH< I )-YS(l I j*j2 1*2000.0
WPITC( ICUT,202)I,XH(I),YH(I > ,ICCDE( I) fP
3C0 CCMINUE
fcP ITE( ICUT ,201 )
PRINT EACH FALSE CCNTACT POSITION 6 COOE
TC 301 1=1, NUM
kPITE(ICUT f 202IItXSCIIfYSCIIf ISTATdl
3C 1 CCMINUE
2C0 FCRMT(///10X,14HST/*TUS AT T IME , F8 . 3 , // 20X ,9HHS STATUS
*// )
501 FCPMAT( 1H0,20X, 14HCGNTACT STATLS)







ccmmcn /ss/ xs< 1000 »,ys< igoo ) ,vxs( iooo) , vys( icoo) ,
*ISTAT( 10001 , TS( 1000) , V* AX , NOS ( 1000 > , NUM, MAX
CCMMCN /HS/ XH(6) ,YH(6) ,ICC0E(6) , RS
,
DEL T , NH S , T L , TCS










IF N > COMPUTE T




TC E = TL







CALL JOINT (K,L )
IF (L) 401,401,400
CCNTACT HAS BEEN CORRECTLY CLASSIFIED
4CC CALL RESUMC(K)
GCTO 503
CCNTACT HAS NOT BEEN CORRECTLY CLASSIFIED
STCRE THE NEXT TRACK EVENT 6 CHECK THE NUMBER
CN THE SCENE
401 CALL SNE(TP*CELT,4, I0UM,K,&999)
IF (NOS(K)-MAX) 403,502,502
IF A HS IS AVAILABLE SEND HIM TC THE SCENE
4C3 CO 300 1 = 1, NHS





3C1 , 5 CO, ?C1
CCMIMJf
L( 301 1=1, NHS





rrs( k )=nps (<> l















( I > = XS(K )
(I J = YS(K )
N T I N U F.
TURN






SIBKCUTINF U P A T E
CCP^CN /SS/ XS( 1000 ) ,YS( 1000 ) ,VXS( 1C00) ,VYS( 1C00) ,
i I 1TAT( 1000 ) ,TS<100 0),V^AX,MJS<10001 ,NUM, MAX
CCPMCN /LS/ XH(fc) ,YH( 6) , ICC0EC6) f «S f O£LT ,NhS »TL ,TQS
CCNMCM /UT IL/TP, IX, PCS, PONS, I D'J P , N S , AVG( 2 ) , T A VG ( 1 000 ) ,
*NC fTDARtTSr.fNGAKfZtNREPStNGRPSi I CUT, CVRL AP ,XBAP ,SC
CL 3CC 1 = 1, NUM
II- THE CCNTACT IS ACTIVE UPC ATE ITS PCS IT I CN
;c<
2CI
If ( ISTAT( n-i ) ^00
XS(I)=XS<1)+VXS<I1*
YS( I ) = YS( I )*VYS( I )*








(TP-TS< I ) )/6C.O
61
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